Although it might seem obvious that advance directives about the kind of care a person would and would not want at the end of their life (at a time when they are not themselves competent to decide) are uncontroversial and widely accepted in our society, Rebecca Dresser and John Robertson disagree. They claim that since the incompetent person's interests are vastly different from that person's previously competent interests -- or, alternatively, that the incompetent self is a different person than the former competent self -- only the contemporaneous best interests of the presently incompetent person should be our concern when deciding a course of medical treatment (or nontreatment). Evaluate Dresser and Robertson's argument. Do you believe that, if you become incompetent in the future, that your future incompetent self has an important relationship to your present competent self? Why or why not? Turn then to the further question about what your answer means for the status of advance directives, and so whether a competent person should be allowed to choose a course of medical treatment for their incompetent future self.