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PHIL 154: Issues of Life and Death
Paper #1

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     One heavily contested point between pro-choice and pro-life factions is that of the status of the fetus: Is it human.  Pro-lifers argue adamantly that a fetus has the same rights as a human being, thus killing it would be murder, which is wrong.  Pro-choice advocates disagree with that claim, saying that a fetus is not yet a human, as it has not yet been born.  Thompsons initial adoption of the key Pro-Life argument playing into her persuasive argument creates a formidable and valid argument for abortion advocates.

     Thompson begins by outlining what she calls the violinist analogy.  This analogy asks you the reader to imagine that he wakes up in a hospital, the victim of a kidnapping by the Society of Music Lovers, who required your kidneys to save a famous violinists life (Thompson, 139-140).  You are a perfect match, and the doctors inform you that you must stay in the hospital for the next nine months at which point the violinist will recover and you will be free to leave (140).  You could, of course, simply unplug yourself from the violinist and go on your way, but in doing so, you would kill the violinist (140).  Thompson then poses the question as to whether or not you have an obligation to the violinist to say.  Granted, it would be very nice of you to stay, but few would argue that you are actually obligated to. 

     This, Thompson claims, is analogous to abortion.  The mother is of course you, trapped into the decision as to whether or not to stay nine months and thus save the violinists life, or to unplug yourself and go along your way. 

     Though no doubt well presented, Thompsons argument does have flaws.  Most obvious, of course, is that you, the reader, are kidnapped, which is to say you had no choice over whether or not you were actually there.  This arguably is analogous to rape, but not to all cases.  Many cases of abortion deal with a woman who engaged in consenting sexual intercourse.  Accordingly, the violinist analogy does make a strong case for abortion in the case of rape, but leaves open other non-rape cases.  As is often pointed out by many feminists, the violinist analogy presents the reader with a bed-ridden state if he or she chooses to stay and save the violinists life.  This, they argue, is largely un-analogous, as many women enjoy pregnancy and very rarely are bedridden at all, much less for the entire nine months.  Despite this, however, Thompson still does make a thought provoking case and offers a very valid challenge to pro-life advocates.

     Thompson then supplements with yet another analogy to clear up the ambiguities left by the first.  In this, she describes being in ones house that is overly humid (Thompson, 487-488).  If one were to open the window, it would clear the air and make the house hospitable again.  Unfortunately, it would also open the window to burglars (487-488).  Of course, a burglary would be rare, but opening the window creates the opportunity for burglary, so by opening the window, does one invite burglary?  Moreover, if a burglary does occur, are you responsible for welcoming the burglar in?

     This is Thompsons attempt to justify abortion in non-rape cases.  If a woman is involved in consenting sex, is she then welcoming a child into her womb? This burglar analogy brings into question whether or not responsibility should be taken into account when considering abortion cases.  It also presents the question as to where responsibility does come into play.  When using contraception, one obviously is trying not to get pregnant, but there is always a chance of contraceptive failure.  If contraceptive failure occurs, is the woman then responsible?  What if the contraceptive was damaged on purpose by a third party?  Is responsibility there?   What if no contraception was used?  If one was just caught in the moment and did not think about using contraception?  Does fault lie there?  Or, better yet, what if the couple was actually trying to conceive?  How much responsibility is then assumed?  And how exactly does this responsibility correlate to the question of abortion? 

     Thompsons argument seems to say that though one knows there may be unintentional responsibility because the woman did not truly invite the child in, and thus has no obligation to it.  Though again well stated, it leaves open a gaping hole: what happens when one actually tries to conceive.  At this point, many would claim that the woman is responsible, as she fully willingly invited the conception and thus the child.  However, does this mean she can no longer have an abortion?  Even if, going on the previous assumption, this child is seen as a full-fledged human.  This brings up a rather interesting point.  One could go back and alter the prior analogies of Thompson.  Concerning the burglar analogy, the probability of burglary is always present.  What if one actually opened the window in hopes that the burglar would come in, perhaps wanting to heroically catch him?  Then, if the burglar does come, is the person then at fault if something is stolen?  On the other hand, if one said, Hey, Ill be a nice guy and help this violinist out, only to find after a month that staying in bed is really boring, and that youd rather do something, which this is inhibiting.  Are you required to continue your stay with the violinist or to just cut your loses from the burglar? 

This brings another thing into question:  Which holds a higher value, ones intention to do something or the ability to change his or her opinion after the fact.  Though intent does seem to hold credibility, the idea that one could not change their mind and their intent must be carried out is ridiculous.  This would also go to say that all children must do what they originally wanted as an occupation, and were this the case wed have entirely too many teachers and firemen.  Thankfully, one does have the ability to change his mind.  Perhaps that is a bit extreme, but the ability to changes ones mind is universal: one may end a marriage in divorce or a job with quitting.  These, too, are things one enters into with responsibility, but still have the ability to change.  One is not considered immoral for getting a divorce or quitting their job.  Thus, changing ones mind must be okay. 

It could be opposed by the significance of the subject: human life is not something that is usually scoffed at.  Certainly one should not slow to a stop for pedestrians, and then change their mind.  That is ridiculous. 

This argument can easily be invalidated using Thompsons original violinist analogy.  Despite the value of human life, when one must give him or her for months on end it becomes the womans choice.  And the validity of that choice proves that despite claims to the importance of human life, one still may choose.

Through Thompsons odd approach beginning with the assumption of one of the strongest pro-life arguments, she presents a unique argument that presents a true challenge to pro-life advocates.  Thompsons arguments through her violinist and burglar analogies address many key issues surrounding abortion.  It is a good argument because it addresses the other side, presents points that either side would agree with, and follows it into a conclusion that clearly shows abortion is acceptable.  Thompson provides a distinct and thought-provoking argument that offers a great challenge to anti-abortionists through her provocative analogies.

 

Work Cited

 

Thompson, Judith Jarvis.  A Defense of Abortion.  Philosophy and Public Affairs.  Vol. 1.  Princeton UP, 1971.


Question:

Judith Jarvis Thomson attempts to undermine a standard anti-abortion argument based upon the fetus's putative right to life. Assuming just for the sake of the argument that the fetus is indeed a full fledged human being with a right to life, Thomson proceeds to sketch the following "target argument":

Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed.

Central to Thomson's attempt to overcome this argument are her so-called violinist and burglar analogies. First, briefly present the details of the violinist analogy and then critically assess its argumentative power. In your reasoned opinion, how successful is this analogy in defeating the above pro-life argument? Then briefly present the burglar analogy. Why does Thomson feel compelled to supplement the violinist analogy with this second analogy? In your reasoned opinion, how successful is the burglar analogy in dispelling the problems left over by the case of the violinist? (In plainer words, how successful is the burglar analogy in dealing with the problem of the woman's responsibility for engaging in sexual intercourse and thereby engendering a human being? Come to think of it, should it matter to the morality of abortion whether or not a woman intentionally had sex knowing that a child could result--i.e., assuming, for the sake of the argument, that the fetus is a full person?)